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I. INTRODUCTION
Eight thousand people die from AIDS in the developing world everyday due to the lack
of access to essential medicines.1 The main barrier to access is high drug prices.2 Significant
advances in medicine and technology have improved public health and extended overall life
expectancy, but not for everyone due to lack of access resulting from exorbitant prices.3 Despite
government regulatory agencies and pharmaceutical research departments working together to
develop safe and effective medicines at an increasing rate, access to these medicines has been
limited.4 Crucial new medicines for infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS, Malaria, and
Tuberculosis are priced out of the reach of the millions of people in the developing world, who
gravely need them.5 The inflated price of these vital medicines is due in part to global patent
rules, which restrict the availability and access to affordable generic versions of life-saving
patented medicines.6

Developing country governments have attempted to improve access to

essential medicines by taking various measures, which reduce the price of drugs, but they have
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faced extreme pressure from developed countries and from the multinational pharmaceutical
industry based on the current system of global pharmaceutical patent protection.7
[Patents and] medicine are inextricably inter-linked. Patents are a monopoly. Drug companies
possess separate monopolies over many life-saving and other drugs, including those that treat
HIV-AIDS. As monopolists, these companies have no compunctions about fixing high prices for
essential drugs. High prices create a clear divide between the rich who can afford the medicine
and the poor who cannot.8

The major complaint concerning current international patent law is the imbalance
between rights of the pharmaceutical companies and the lack of obligation to provide access to
essential medicines.9 Despite the assurance from the developed countries that the global patent
system is a stimulant for pharmaceutical innovation, research, and development; in reality, this
innovation, research, and development is almost exclusively confined to the private sector and
areas of profitable return.10 Therefore, in developing countries with relatively small commercial
markets and low levels of disposable income, there is very little incentive for pharmaceutical
companies to conduct extensive research and development in creating drugs for life-threatening
diseases limited mostly to the developing world.11 Only 1% of the 1,400 new medicines created
in the last 25 years were developed for the treatment of tropical diseases (AIDS, malaria,
tuberculosis, etc.), despite tropical diseases killing tens of thousands of people each year.12
Tropical diseases are almost entirely confined to the developing world and again, do not
represent a profitable market for the pharmaceutical industry.13 The developed country argument
that patent protection facilitates innovation and thereby improves overall world health is rebutted
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with data showing that although patent protection has increased over the last 20 years, the drug
innovation rate has fallen and the number of drugs with little or no therapeutic gain has
increased.14 “Essential medicines are not a luxury whose availability can be left to private
market forces only, but an essential component of the fulfillment of the right to health.”15
It is important not to get lost in the legal issues and remember the human side of this
problem.16 “[E]ffective medicines that dramatically increase the life expectancy of people living
with AIDS became available in Europe and North America a decade ago.”17 However, despite
the existence of these drugs, the World Health Organization (WHO) has found that nearly two
billion people in developing countries still lack regular access to vital medicines.18 Even with
major progress in disease detection and treatment, eleven million people will die each year, most
of them in developing countries, as a result of preventable and treatable infectious diseases.19
Several millions more people in developing countries will suffer with prolonged battles of
sickness and disability.20 The premature death, sickness, and disability resulting from infectious
diseases could be avoided if developing countries had better access to affordable medicines.21
In an increasingly interdependent world, where poverty, disease, violence, crime, war, regional
conflicts and human rights and environmental [a]buses persist . . . clear international standards
will help ensure that business will be part of the solution to today’s problems and not – knowingly
or unknowingly – exacerbate them.22
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It is crucial that international and domestic rules affecting research and development
(R&D) and availability of medicines must be primarily motivated by global public health needs
rather than simple industrial, economic, or commercial considerations.23 With the dramatic
increase in infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria) and the marginalization by
pharmaceutical companies and governments of health problems not affecting the developed
world, strong international support is needed to defend global public health.24 All countries must
recognize the importance of improving global health by combating neglected diseases.25
Developed and developing country governments can combat neglected diseases by ensuring
sufficient, sustainable, and long-term financing to address R&D needs and by working towards
changing the way health R&D priorities are set and financed.26 Although the global patent
system has a significant role in stimulating investment and innovation, it also should balance the
desire to reward inventors with the greater need to allow people to benefit from these inventions
thereby emphasizing the importance of global public health.27
[I]n the pharmaceutical sector the winners will be the large northern-based transnational
companies which, as a result of the lengthened patent protection provided by WTO rules, will be
able to sell their new medicines at higher prices. The losers are likely to be the millions of people
who will be unable to afford vital new medicines, and hard-pressed government health services.
This situation will undermine efforts to increase productivity and eradicate poverty, and will result
in a widening of the gap between rich and poor nations.28

This comment will analyze the need to amend and revise the current global
pharmaceutical patent system under TRIPS to take into account the needs of developing
countries and overall public health. This comment will emphasize that the current international
trade rules, which although administered by the WTO, are dictated by developed country
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governments and powerful pharmaceutical companies, and therefore, without reform will further
diminish the access of poor people in developing countries to vital medicines. Part II of this
comment will provide a general overview of the international trade law governing patents on
pharmaceuticals focusing specifically on the development of the current global pharmaceutical
patent system, which was originally created by the WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Law (TRIPS) in 1994, supplemented by the WTO’s Doha Declaration and the WTO’s
Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health. Further, it will discuss the implicit and explicit exceptions to TRIPS provided within
TRIPS Articles 8, 27, 30, 31, and 73. Part III will provide some general arguments used by
developed countries to justify the imposition of stringent patent laws on developing countries
and will argue against strong pharmaceutical patent protection in developing countries. Part IV
will discuss the implications of TRIPS for developing countries, specifically their access to
pharmaceuticals in an international trade environment. Further, it will show how the WTO is
restricting competition, increasing prices, and limiting access to essential medicines. Part V will
discuss the current patent laws of two crucial developing countries, India and South Africa. Part
VI will provide possible solutions and considerations for reform of the global patent protection
system under TRIPS. Part VII will conclude the comment with a brief summary.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW GOVERNING PATENTS ON PHARMACEUTICALS
A. The WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS).
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), adopted
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, came into
effect on January 1, 1995 as package deal included in the WTO/General Agreement on Tariffs
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and Trade (GATT).29 In order to become a member of the WTO, a country must agree to
become subject to the broad WTO/GATT Agreement, which includes these TRIPS patent
provisions.30 Developed countries designed TRIPS based on their own intellectual property
regimes and placed it within the 1995 WTO/GATT Agreement to create binding international
patent obligations.31 TRIPS created a common set of international intellectual property rules
establishing minimum levels of patent protection that all countries within the WTO must give to
other member countries.32 Potential competitors are prohibited from producing and marketing
cheap generics of these pharmaceutical products for a twenty-year period.33 Thereby giving the
pharmaceutical patent holder a monopoly based on the exclusive marketing rights on its patented
product for at least those twenty years.34
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Board enforces TRIPS to ensure member country
compliance.35 All member country governments must comply with TRIPS by introducing these
stringent patent laws domestically or face severe penalties from the WTO.36 Although this may
seem like an easy task, most developing countries do not have strong domestic patent laws,
therefore TRIPS provides an extremely high standard of patent protection.37 If a member
country fails to meet its obligations under TRIPS, the burden of proof is on the defending
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country.38 If the defending country fails to meet its burden, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Board most often allows the prosecuting country to impose trade sanctions.39
By restricting the right of governments to allow the production, marketing, and import of low-cost
copies of patented medicines (called generic drugs), the WTO’s rules will restrict competition,
increase prices, and further reduce the already limited access of poor people to vital medicines.40

TRIPS was theoretically designed as a social policy tool to encourage innovation by
establishing minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property including patents on
pharmaceuticals; however, these standards were developed based on Western European and
North American property law by wealthy countries with little regard for the needs of developing
countries.41 The major selling point for the issuance of patents is in theory by “providing limited
exclusivity to the ‘inventors’ of products . . . innovation will be promoted and society as a whole
will benefit from the availability of new and improved products.”42 In reality, the twenty-year
global patent protection system has created an extremely profitable and powerful group of
multinational pharmaceutical companies that by law are allowed to deny access to life-saving
medicines.43
1.

TRIPS Generally: Preamble &Article 7 (Objectives)

The express intent of TRIPS, declared in the preamble is “to ensure that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights [including patents] do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade.”44 TRIPS Article 7 provides that the protection of intellectual
property rights will promote both technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of
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technology “to the mutual advantage of producers and users . . . in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare.”45
2.

TRIPS Limited Implicit and Explicit Exceptions (“Public Health Safeguards”)

Although overall TRIPS grants strong patent protection to member countries, there are
implicit and explicit exceptions contained in TRIPS Article 8, 27, 30, 31, and 73 that if used
effectively could provide developing countries with ammunition to combat some of their lack of
access problems.46
a. Implicit Exceptions: TRIPS Article 8 (Principles) & TRIPS Article 27
(Patentable Subject Matter)
TRIPS Article 8 provides a guiding principle upon which all other provisions of TRIPS
should be read.47 Article 8 mandates that in creating domestic laws, member countries “may, in
formulating and amending their national laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interestin sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development.”48 Therefore, Article 8
provides possible grounds that developing country governments could use to combat tropical
diseases such as HIV-AIDS.49
First, it allows governments to adopt measures for the protection of public health.50
Second, it allows governments to adopt measures for the protection of its own country’s socioeconomic and technological development, which may provide possible grounds for developing
country governments to combat the effect of the HIV-AIDS crisis on labor, industrial, farming,
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and food markets.51 Third, the use of the word “necessary” indicates that the government does
not have complete discretion to use these measures, but that its use is subject to review by the
WTO.52 Although this seems restrictive, the WTO could use this discretion to instead help
developing country governments combat life-threatening diseases.53 For example, the WTO
could grant a developing country government “substantial latitude . . . in the midst of a health
crisis” pursuant to the clarification of TRIPS through the Doha Declaration and Decision
discussed below.”54 Fourth, Article 8 is limited to such measures “consistent with the
provisions” of TRIPS.55 Again, this could be seen a limitation.56 However, since Article 8 was
intended to be a guiding principle, developing country governments can take public health and
development measures reflected in the “flexibilities” contained in Articles 27, 30, 31, and 73,
and still remain consistent with TRIPS pursuant to Article 8.57 Finally, Article 8 allows
developing country governments “to prevent the ‘abuse’ of intellectual property rights or to
prevent practices that ‘unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.’”58 These terms “abuse,” “unreasonably restrain trade,” and “adversely affect” are
subjective and are open to different cultural and economic interpretations, which could provide
developing country governments will additionally ways to improve access to pharmaceuticals.59
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Other possible grounds, which developing country governments might be able to combat
infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS are found in Articles 27.60 TRIPS Article 27 provides that
“patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial
application.”61 There is considerable room for flexibility and interpretation of TRIPS Article
27.62 Developing country governments can create domestic patent systems benefiting their own
countries by developing their own standards and interpretations of the undefined terms in TRIPS
Article 27 in their own domestic jurisprudence.63 For example, Article 27 (2) allows countries to
“exclude from patentability inventions . . . necessary to protect ordre public or morality,
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”64 Developing country governments
could argue that the HIV-AIDS crisis is a moral or public issue, thereby incorporating social,
ethical, and moral considerations into the domestic patent regime.65 However, this flexibility
does not provide developing countries with a clear answer on how to provide better access to
lifesaving drugs because the denial of patentability of a lifesaving drug would be accompanied
by denial of any commercial exploitation of the drug within that country including the domestic
manufacture of generic versions or compulsory licensing of the drug for a profit.66 Arguably,
developing country governments could, after denying patentability, produce and distribute the
product non-commercially either through a state-owned enterprise or private non-profit
manufacturer.67
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[I]f a nation takes the position that the prevention and treatment of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is
necessary to protect the ordre public, . . . [TRIPS] . . . would apparently allow that nation to deny
patent protection to relevant pharmaceuticals and then distribute those products, assuming they are
attainable, on a non-profit, non-commercial basis. Since there could be no discrimination between
the rights of foreign and domestic producers, as neither would be allowed to engage in commercial
exploitation, such a strategy would appear consistent with the terms of . . . [TRIPS].68

b. Explicit Exceptions: TRIPS Article 30 (Exceptions to Rights Conferred) &
TRIPS Article 31 (Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder) &
Article 73 (Security Exceptions)
In addition to the flexibility inherent in the subjective language of Articles 8 and 27, there are
explicit exceptions under TRIPS Articles 30, 31, and 73, which developing country governments
should utilize to improve access to essential pharmaceuticals.69 “Any exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent or other use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the patent holder must be in accordance with either TRIPS Article 30 or TRIPS
Article 31.”70 Through these limited exceptions, developing country governments have a few
significant tools that allow them to balance the public interest of their citizens with the
proprietary claims of patent holders.71
First, the developing country government can override a patent by authorizing a compulsory
license for production of a drug under TRIPS Article 31.72 TRIPS Article 31 allows WTO
member countries to authorize “other use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by
the government.”73 A compulsory patent license is “when a government allows a third party to
make, use or sell a patented product or a product obtained through a patented process without the
68
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consent of the patent owner.”74 The “use” referred to in the preamble to TRIPS Article 31 (“use
by . . . third parties authorized by the government”) includes granting compulsory licenses.75 For
compulsory licenses, TRIPS Article 31 mandates that:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to
obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall,
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. . . . ;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized
...
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which
enjoys such use;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such use;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate
interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances which
led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have the
authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these circumstances;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking
into account the economic value of the authorization;
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such shall be subject to
judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to
judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;76

Therefore, Article 31 allows governments to issue compulsory licenses on public health grounds
to authorize production of patented drugs without the consent of patent holders, subject to
adequate compensation.77 Governments can also issue compulsory licenses in response to
national health emergencies.78 “In the case of ‘a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency’ or ‘a public health crisis,’ . . . subparagraph (b) [of TRIPS Article 31] merely
requires that ‘the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably
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practicable.’”79 Finally, developing country governments can also issue compulsory licenses to
curtail excessive prices.80
Governments can grant compulsory licenses for domestic production or importation of
pharmaceuticals.81 However, there are significant obstacles for developing countries in being
able to grant compulsory licenses either for domestic production or for parallel importation.82 In
order for a government to make effective use of a compulsory license for domestic production
under TRIPS Article 31, it must have a reasonably sophisticated pharmaceutical industry to
produce medicine and it must have a manufacturer with sufficient manufacturing capacity to
create economies of scale to keep the costs down and the price of the medicine affordable.83
Further, to utilize a compulsory license for importation under TRIPS Article 31, the government
must be able to import the pharmaceuticals at an affordable price in the quantity and quality
required.84 Many governments cannot utilize the compulsory license for domestic production
because they do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity.85
Also many governments cannot utilize the compulsory license for importation because a
potential importer is prohibited from manufacturing and exporting the drug from a member
country with sufficient manufacturing capacity.86 Although a compulsory license might be
granted for the domestic manufacture of a drug in a member country with sufficient
manufacturing capacity, this potential importing member country is prohibited from exporting a
large fraction of the drugs made under that compulsory license.87 This is because TRIPS Article
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31(f) permits issuance of compulsory licenses only if it is “predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”88 Therefore, pursuant to these strict
compulsory license requirements, developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs)
cannot obtain drugs through importation at an affordable price in the quantity and quality
required.89 As discussed below, this restriction on the use of compulsory licenses for importation
is even more significant as many developing member countries (like India), who until recently
have been able to export huge quantities of generic drugs because its domestic patent laws were
not TRIPS compliant, were required to enact TRIPS compliant domestic laws on January 1,
2005.90 Therefore, the developing countries with sufficient manufacturing capacity will now be
more limited in their ability to export medicines to other developing and LDCs, which do not
have sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce life-saving medicines.91
Second, a government can engage in parallel importing.92 Governments can allow the
importation of a patented product, which is marketed elsewhere at prices lower than those in its
domestic market.93 This means importing a patented drug from wherever it is sold the cheapest,
regardless of the wishes of the patent holder.94 Although parallel importing is not specifically
mentioned by TRIPS, pharmaceutical companies and developed country government (U.S.) are
motivated to make sure that it is banned through domestic patent legislation.95
The last exception is under TRIPS Article 73.96 Article 73 declares that nothing in
TRIPS shall prohibit a member country from taking any action “which it considers necessary for
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the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations.”97 Additionally, TRIPS Article 73 declares that no member country shall
be prohibited “from taking any action in pursuance of its obligation under the United Nations
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.”98 This security exception, if
exercised, can relieve a member country from virtually all of its substantive obligations under
TRIPS.99
B. The WTO’s Doha Declaration- Access to Medicine for All
Whether exceptions to patent protection can be made in the case of a public health crisis,
was one of the critical issues dominating the discussion at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar in November of 2001.100 During this Conference, the WTO released
its Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration).101 The WTO
recognized some of the lack of access concerns raised by developing countries when it adopted
the Doha Declaration.102 In order to attempt to increase access to pharmaceuticals, the Doha
Declaration granted countries the power to manufacture generic drugs made before the
introduction of TRIPS and the power to produce newer drugs through compulsory licensing.103
The 2001 Doha Declaration indicated that the WTO and TRIPS “can and should be interpreted
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and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicine for all.”104
Therefore, the Doha Declaration more clearly outlined the flexibilities contained in
TRIPS that countries could use to overcome the barriers created by patents.105 Further, the Doha
Declaration extended the transitional period until 2016, during which the LDCs are not obliged
to enforce or grant patents on pharmaceutical products.106 Unfortunately, the WTO’s Doha
Declaration failed to resolve whether further exceptions could be made to supply
pharmaceuticals to countries, which lack sufficient manufacturing capacity to make effective use
of TRIPS’ compulsory licensing provisions.107 With regard to this unsettled issue, paragraph 6
of the Doha Declaration simply declared, “We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of
2002.”108
C. The WTO’s Decision “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”
Other efforts to solve this lack of access issue were attempted in November 2002 and
February 2003.109 Finding an acceptable “expeditious solution” became a priority to be solved
before the WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico.110 In August 2003, the
WTO General Council adopted a Decision entitled “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (Decision).111 In response to

104

World Trade Organization (WTO) – Doha Ministerial Conference 2001: Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] para. 4; Dhavan, supra note
8.
105
Hoen, supra note 1 at 4.
106
Hoen, supra note 1 at 4.
107
Nolff, supra note 70 at 293.
108
Doha Declaration, supra note 104, para. 6.
109
Nolff, supra note 70 at 293.
110
Id.
111
Id.

16

Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, immediately before the Cancun Ministerial Conference, the
WTO General Council approved this Decision, which was designed to make it easier for poor
developing countries that lack domestic capacity to import cheaper generic drugs produced under
compulsory licenses.112 Normally, under TRIPS, it would be illegal to copy a brand name drug
that was still under a patent.113 However, as discussed above, it was agreed in the Doha
Declaration that TRIPS should not prevent member countries from taking measures to protect the
public health of its citizens.114 Therefore, this Decision was intended to supplement the Doha
Declaration by providing clarification of the steps necessary to improve access to essential
medicines.115 Formally, the Decision is considered an interim good faith waiver of TRIPS
Article 31(f) to protect public health and is applicable until TRIPS is amended.116 The Decision
allows any member country that produces generic copies of patented pharmaceuticals under a
compulsory license to export these products to eligible importing countries (i.e., countries
without sufficient manufacturing capacity).117
In order to improve access to essential medicines, a member country lacking sufficient
manufacturing capacity must follow the general step-by-step process laid out by the WTO in the
Decision.118 First, an importing member country must notify the TRIPS Council of its request to
import certain pharmaceuticals indicating the names and expected quantities to be imported.119
Second, the importing member country must prove it has insufficient pharmaceutical
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manufacturing capacity for the requested pharmaceuticals.120 Third, the exporting member
country must issue a compulsory license reflecting that only the quantity necessary to meet the
specified needs of the importing member country will be manufactured.121 Fourth, the
compulsory license must indicate that the entire quantity produced for the purpose of this license
will be exported to the specified importing member country.122 Fifth, “adequate remuneration”
or compensation should be paid to the patent holder by the exporting member country taking into
account the “economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been authorized.”123
Finally, the Decision requires all member countries to take “reasonable measures” to prevent the
re-exportation of the generic drugs produced under these compulsory licenses and to provide
“effective legal means for the prevention of diversion.”124
Although this Decision was intended to provide clarification, instead it created a complex
mechanism that has not improved drug access in developing countries and has not aided generic
drug production in countries like India.125 The Decision needlessly complicated the exportation
process by creating a mechanism that evaluates each situation on a country-by-country and drugby-drug basis.126 The WTO’s focus in the Decision on the smaller picture ignores the developing
country manufacturers’ need to create economies of scale to continue to operate and provide the
drugs at a reasonable price to developing countries that lack sufficient manufacturing capacity.127
The WTO appears to be attempting to improve developing countries lack of access
concerns with the implicit and explicit exceptions contained within TRIPS, the Doha
Declaration, and the Decision. All of these attempts to provide clarifications have needlessly
120
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added to the complication and confusion revolving around international pharmaceutical patent
laws. Although, the WTO is attempting to improve access to pharmaceuticals for certain select
countries suffering from a national emergency or a public health crisis, developing countries
should not be held to the same level of stringent patent protection as developed western
countries.
III. PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The protection of pharmaceuticals by patents involve complex issues, therefore there are
strong arguments in favor and against providing patents in developing countries. In developed
countries, intellectual property rights have in some respects evolved into a natural right.128
Patent rights are now viewed almost as a fundamental entitlement in developed countries and this
right attaches “to man as a human being much like equal protection, equality, and selfdetermination.”129 “[A] fundamental right of man cannot be limited by territorial boundaries,
and all nations (irrespective of wealth, history, culture, or need) must award universal
acceptance.”130 The current international patent system is argued to represent a balancing of
interests designed to maximize global social welfare.131
A patentee receives exclusive rights over his or her creation for a limited period of time in
exchange for a complete, public disclosure of the knowledge upon which the invention is based.
Not only may the public use this knowledge upon the patent’s term expiration, but also the
knowledge may serve (even during the patent term itself) as the foundation for further
advancement of science and technology in a variety of fields. In addition to this general
dissemination, the monopoly that is granted serves to encourage the patentee to license the
discovery so that the invention can be commercialized, technology can be transferred, and other
products can be developed for the benefit of society. By ensuring protection for creative efforts,
the patent system also provides the necessary incentive for inventiveness since creators will be
able to profit from their R&D investments.132
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A. Developed Countries’ Arguments for Stringent Patent Protection in Developing Countries
The first argument used by developed countries to emphasize the importance of the
international recognition of patents within an international trade environment is that patent
protection encourages participation in the pharmaceutical industry by providing financial
incentives.133 “Patents create more certainty of potential profits at the end of the research cycle
and decrease the risk of investment.”134 Along those same profit-based lines, developed
countries argue that stringent international patent protection is crucial in allowing pharmaceutical
companies to recoup their substantial research and development (R&D) costs.135 The
pharmaceutical industry, unlike other industries, devotes the majority of its resources to R&D.136
During the last twenty years, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry’s percentage of sales allocated to
R&D increased from 11.9 percent in 1980 to 18.5 percent in 2001.137 Therefore, developed
countries argue the most effective way to continue to provide financial incentives for
pharmaceutical companies is to their protect profit margins from being eroded by cheap generic
drugs through internationally enforceable patent rights.138
Related to the first argument, the second major argument offered by developed countries
to justify stringent international patent protection is strong patent protection fuels innovation.139
Developed countries argue that by providing patents pharmaceutical companies will research and
develop more drugs that will improve the overall global public health.140 However, most of the
developed countries’ arguments justifying stringent patent protection do not explicitly revolve
133
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around their pharmaceutical companies’ economic interests for obvious political reasons, but
rather tend to emphasize the global benefits of stringent patent protection in general.141 By
providing pharmaceutical companies with a monopoly over the sale and distribution of their
drugs for a fixed time period, developed countries argue that patents are supposed to create
incentives for R&D activities in every country’s private sectors.142 This basically means that
developing countries’ ensuing concerns with high pharmaceutical prices and inaccessibility to
essential medicines are countered with the developed country theory that too much access caused
by weak patent protection will create more inaccessibility in the long run, resulting in the
stagnancy of new drug discoveries.143
Third, developed countries argue that stringent patent protection is necessary to create an
international trade environment.144 Supporters of TRIPS argue that international law creating
enforceable intellectual property rights are necessary to create an international economy and are
a natural progression from the post-World War II economy.145 Therefore, the inclusion of
TRIPS as a WTO agreement is a requisite gradual move towards economic globalization.146
“[T]he push for more secure and stable international trading systems, and the emergence of the
hyper-connected international economy, have necessitated strict intellectual property
protections.”147
The fourth argument offered by developed countries for the importance of international
patent law emphasizes the benefits available to developing countries through technology transfer

141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Barnes, supra note 4 at 917.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Matthew Kramer, Comment, The Bolar Amendment Abroad: Preserving the Integrity of American Patents
Overseas After the South African Medicines Act, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 553, 557 (2000).
142

21

and foreign direct investment.148 “TRIPS . . . encourages technology sharing, which could lead
to pharmaceutical companies (both generic and multi-national) sharing expertise, giving more
developing countries the capability to produce drugs for their own people.”149 Developed
countries argue that the benefits from strong patent protection will not be limited to their own
rich and powerful pharmaceutical companies, but will assist local manufacturers in developing
countries to establish their own R&D activities, which will be better suited to local needs.150 In
the international patent process, developing countries are supposed to benefit from the
dissemination of knowledge required through patent disclosures, which can be used as inputs for
more innovation.151
Therefore, IPRs [including patents] will support innovative behavior that adapts existing
technologies to local needs of which the cumulative effect can ignite growth in knowledge and
economic activity. The local firms will also have an equal opportunity to sell their products
abroad in order to reap the higher profits currently enjoyed by western [multinational
pharmaceutical enterprises] that own the majority of existing pharmaceutical patents.152

Developed countries argue stringent patent protection facilitates contracting
between firms and increases technology transfer, thereby increasing the production of
drugs and the efficiency of the R&D process for new drugs.153 For example, technology
transfer can occur through the shipment of advanced inputs to subsidiaries in local
markets in developing countries.154 In this way, pharmaceutical companies can
theoretically indirectly share blueprints, product designs, and skilled producer services.155
Along these lines, developed countries argue that developing countries will
benefit from international pharmaceutical patent law through foreign direct investment
148
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from wealthy member countries to poor member countries with stable patent protection
systems.156 With strong international patent protection, pharmaceutical companies
should be more willing to commit to “foreign direct investment, joint ventures, and
licensing agreements in developing countries.”157 Developed countries argue that as
patent laws are strengthened in developing countries, foreign direct investment is likely
to increase “in complex, but easily copied technologies” including pharmaceuticals.158
Without stringent patent protection not only will the providers of foreign direct
investment hesitate to invest in these developing countries, but many pharmaceutical
companies may refuse to export their drugs in order to protect their global profit
margins.159 Therefore, the thrust of the developed countries’ argument is it is the
developing world’s responsibility to provide a business environment friendly to the needs
of wealthy, multinational pharmaceutical companies in order to have access to essential
medicines.160
B. Developing Countries’ Arguments Against Stringent Patent Protection in Developing
Countries
Developing countries argue that instead of patents being viewed as a fundamental or
natural right, patent protection should instead merely represent a conscious governmental
decision to maximize social welfare and patents should instead be viewed as governmental
“grants,” “licenses,” or “privileges,” which could then be conditioned or even refused rather than
universally accepted.161 Unfortunately for developing countries whether rightfully or
wrongfully, these intellectual “property” rights have been placed on a “moral plane” by powerful
156
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developed countries and have been removed from political and ideological challenge.162
Although, developed countries have strong arguments in favor of stringent patent protection,
developing countries have even strong counter-arguments that patent protection should be more
flexible in developing countries.
First, in response to developed countries’ arguments that stringent international patent
protection is needed to allow pharmaceutical companies to continue to operate, to create
financial incentive for innovation, and to allow them to recoup their R&D costs, developing
countries argue that it is unfair to deny access to essential medicines simply because poor
developing countries do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce or develop these
essential medicines. In fact, “[o]nly a few developed countries (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and United States) in the world have the
sufficiently sophisticated pharmaceutical industry and significant research base necessary to
conduct complex research and development activities.”163 Further, many monopolist drug
companies receive tax benefits and foundation funds that help them finance their R&D costs.164
However, developed countries have used this power to restrict access to developing countries
and to place significant pressure on developing countries to strictly conform their domestic
patent laws to TRIPS.165
Second, although developed countries argue that “[u]ltimately, the economic incentives
derived from monopoly power of individual pharmaceuticals will benefit overall global welfare
through the discovery of new drugs and therapies that cure debilitating, if not fatal, diseases.”166
In reality, only a few pharmaceutical companies (including GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis) have
162
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increased their investment in infectious-disease research and even fewer (only GlaxoSmithKline)
have increased their investment in vaccine development, but only on a small scale.167 Developed
countries argue that one of the disadvantages arising out of weak patent protection in developing
countries is corresponding a lack of focus by pharmaceutical companies on diseases and illnesses
prevalent in developing countries.168 However, it is clear that without great financial incentives
pharmaceutical companies will not focus on diseases and illnesses prevalent in developing
countries.
Third, the developed country theory that stronger patent protection is essential to promote
a stable international economy169 has created a small group of powerful pharmaceutical
multinational enterprises (MNEs) worldwide with significant influence in shaping domestic and
international patent policies.170 Unfortunately, it is primarily these pharmaceutical companies’
business concerns that dictate developed countries’ approaches to implementing patent rights on
an international scale.171 In reality, these patent rights give pharmaceutical companies
monopolies over lifesaving medicines and allow the pharmaceutical company to restrict
competition, limit access, and increase prices.
Finally, contrary to the developed country argument that patent protection facilitates
technology transfer and foreign direct investment, developing countries argue that the current
system does not transfer technology or increase foreign direct investment. Developing countries
argue contrary to the argument that the creation of stringent international patent protection will
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provide developing countries with more access to up-to-date technologies through technology
transfer, instead developing countries become isolated from new technologies and the only
solution is for them to begin building their own technological knowledge from scratch.172 This is
a nearly impossible mission given their economic constraints.173
TRIPS should not have been included within the WTO/GATT Agreement.174
Monopolies should have no place in an international free trade agreement.175 Unfortunately, so
far developed country governments have been more spirited in defending its pharmaceutical
companies than developing countries (like India and South Africa) have been able to defend its
poor who desperately need access to life sustaining drugs.176
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS IN AN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ENVIRONMENT- HOW THE WTO IS RESTRICTING COMPETITION,
INCREASING PRICES, AND LIMITING ACCESS
A. Creating Corporate Pharmaceutical Monopolies Through the Auspices of Free Trade
1. Big Money Means Big Political Power for the Pharmaceutical Industry
Although created under the auspices of free trade, TRIPS, was the product of intense
lobbying by the world’s largest and most powerful pharmaceutical companies (Merck, Pfizer,
GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli Lilly) and of intense political pressure by the world’s largest and most
powerful countries (U.S., Europe, and Japan).177 To put it in perspective, the financial power of
these pharmaceutical companies relative to developing countries is reflected by their market
capitalization, which is collectively greater than the economies of Mexico and India and twice
the gross national product of sub-Saharan Africa.178 This financial power has been converted
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into tremendous political influence both nationally and internationally.179 The Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the most powerful pharmaceutical industry
lobby in the U.S., was a driving force in getting TRIPS adopted and now plays a leading role in
encouraging the Bush Administration to use bilateral negotiations and unilateral economic
sanctions180 against countries that PhRMA believes offer inadequate patent protection.181
Granting patent protection to pharmaceutical companies creates pharmaceutical monopolies,
which in turn translates into higher drug prices based on the companies’ ability to limit access to
these drugs.182 To reduce drug prices, the WTO should consider a major reformation of TRIPS,
in order to create a competitive market for generic drugs in developing countries.183
2. With Big Power Comes Big Responsibility: Pharmaceutical Companies’ Duty to
Supply- Patents and Prices
Pharmaceutical companies should accept that their long-term economic interest is better
served by accepting corporate social responsibility including adopting a more flexible approach
to drug prices and patents in developing countries.184 “Patents are not a gift for drug companies
to exercise power without responsibility.”185 These pharmaceutical companies, by showing a
greater sensitivity to the urgent health needs of developing countries, can restore the legitimacy
of the pharmaceutical industry, as its power ultimately depends on the trust of the public and
governments.186
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In January 2004, after the Brazillian government threatened to override patents and
license generic manufacture, five international pharmaceutical companies cut the price of their
drugs allowing the Brazilian government to save approximately 80 million dollars187 in its annual
drug bill for anti-retrovirals (ARVs).188 This tremendous savings will help to ensure the
sustainability of Brazil’s world-renowned treatment program.189 In addition, Bristol-Myers
Squibb surrendered its exclusive right to Thailand to produce its ARV (didanosine or ddI) after a
three-year legal battle initiated by local activists, who claimed that the high price of the ARV
was an infringement of the human rights of sufferers.190 This enabled the Thai government’s
pharmaceutical labs to manufacture a generic equivalent of the ARV at a fraction of the annual
1,800 dollars191 per patient originally charged by the pharmaceutical company.192 Unfortunately,
Pfizer, the largest pharmaceutical company in the world, still rejects the idea of offering lower
prices in developing countries and instead prefers to respond to public pressure by donating
several drugs to treatment programs in select countries.193 Although, these donations are helpful,
they are unsustainable and do not provide a viable solution to the lack of access concerns.194
Pharmaceutical companies should attempt to improve developing country access to essential
pharmaceuticals without such government or activist threats. One example, in December 2003,
pharmaceutical companies GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim allowed generic
manufacturing firms to provide generic versions of their ARVS to South African patients.195 As
discussed above, many of these changes only came about after these companies were facing legal
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action and widespread social disapproval, but anytime drug prices are reduced or drug access is
increased, it is an improvement.196
Pharmaceutical companies should improve developing country access to essential
medicines by issuing voluntary licenses.197 This would provide a way around TRIPS as major
pharmaceutical companies, as patent holders can bypass the TRIPS patent system by issuing
voluntary licenses to allow other people to copy their drugs under certain conditions.198 This
would make it easier for these pharmaceutical companies’ drugs to be produced generically with
the permission of the company and would greatly improve access.199 Pharmaceutical companies
can work with developing countries rather than compounding the problem by imposing trade
sanctions against developing countries. For example, in 2001, thirty-nine major pharmaceutical
companies attempted to sue the South African government for passing a law not TRIPS
compliant that allowed easy production and importation of generics.200
Following immense pressure from the South African government, the European Parliament and
300,000 people from over 130 countries that signed a petition against the action however, they
were forced to back down. In an effort to put an end to the continuing row, one of the companies,
GlaxoSmithKline, even granted a voluntary license to a major South African generics producer
(Aspen), allowing them to share the rights to their drugs AZT, 3TC and the combination Combivir
without charge. In return, Aspen had to promise to give 30 percent of their net sales to one or
more non-governmental organi[z]ations fighting HIV and AIDS in South Africa, which they
continue to do to this day.201

In addition to the pharmaceutical companies’ duty to supply, there is also hope that
generic drug manufacturing companies in developing countries will assume some of this
responsibility to supply essential medicines and will invest more in R&D instead of simple
reverse engineering.202 This will allow developing country drug manufacturers to develop
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original low cost medicines on their own.203 Some of Indian companies (Cipla and Ranbaxy)
have already begun assuming some of this responsibility by taking advantage of the fact that they
are able to make a variety of different drugs from many competing pharmaceutical companies.204
These companies have combined various ARVs into a one-a-day, easy-to-take fixed dose
combinations that would be very difficult to manufacture in developed countries due to patent
protection, but that are essential to HIV-AIDS treatment in developing countries due to their
simplicity.205 Since different drug companies hold the patents on each individual component of a
drug, pharmaceutical patents hinder the development and availability of recommended fixed
dosed combinations, which are extremely important in effective HIV-AIDS treatment.206
Therefore, if drug manufacturing companies assume some of this duty to supply by creating low
cost medicines on their own, the access to essential medicines in developing countries to
individuals suffering from HIV-AIDS in developing countries would greatly improve.207

The importance of developing country access to second-line drugs is another reason why
generic drug manufacturing companies should accept a duty to supply essential medicine to
developing countries. Unfortunately, first-line drugs, whether brand name or generic, fail in
approximately twenty percent of patients who take them.208 Therefore, some patients need
access to second-line drugs due to side effects or resistance.209 As discussed above, while the
Doha Declaration offers measures to protect the access of existing generics, much more needs to
203
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be done to ensure the production and access to generic second-line drugs.210 This is an enormous
problem in developing countries because as the number of patients on first-line drugs grows and
treatment failures occur, significant numbers of patients will require second-line brand name
drugs that can cost over $3,500 each year, which is approximately twenty times the cost of
generic drugs.211 Doctors Without Borders is hopeful that within the next few years, new
formulations of cheap generic first-line drugs might have fewer side effects and have fewer
instances of failure.212 Further, they are hopeful that generic drug manufacturers will continue
working on cheap versions of second-line drugs.213 For example, “[o]ne promising prospect is to
incorporate [the drug] Viread . . . made by Gilead Sciences Inc. . . . into lower-cost, second-line
treatments for poor [developing] countries.”214 Gilead has been selling Viread to developing
countries for only its cost of production ($1.30 per day), but Gilead has now offered to sell
Viread at 80 cents per day.215 Despite the fact that the cost of Viread is higher than the price of
some three-drug combinations, it demonstrates that cost of second-line drugs might not have to
be as devastating to budgets as some fear.216 However, if the Bush Administration succeeds in
combating the production of these second-line generics through the use of trade agreements with
individual countries, these countries will be precluded from using any low cost, second-line
generic drug.217 Although the responsibility does not fall solely on pharmaceutical and generic
manufacturing companies, it is crucial to global health that these companies take additional steps
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to improve access to essential medicines whether by cutting prices, issuing voluntary licenses,
developing fixed-dose combination drugs, or developing generic versions of second-line drugs.
B. Governmental Duty to Supply
It is both pharmaceutical companies’ and governments’ duty to supply medicine for
AIDS.218 It has been suggested that a constitutional approach to international law should be
considered.219 The international community should recognize “the interlocking relationships of
enforceable contractual and normative duties that have developed between states and their
citizens and between sovereigns and other sovereigns.”220 This argument goes beyond the scope
of this comment, but provides an interesting focus on global welfare and of a government’s duty
to provide access to essential medicines rather than focusing merely on the provisions of
TRIPS.221 AIDS is a global health concern as it has spread to 40 million victims throughout the
world.222 Although Africa has been hit the hardest, AIDS has infected India and all 31 provinces
of China.223 “Medicine without social justice is unacceptable.”224 Therefore, two developing
countries, Costa Rica and Venezuela have required their governments to supply AIDS drugs.225
Although, it is not easy for governments to supply drugs, there are several alternatives
that could be employed to improve access to essential medicines. As discussed above, one
method of improving access to essential medicines is through compulsory licenses. To reiterate,
the WTO Decision allows member countries to import generics from other countries under
compulsory licenses if the member country was unable to manufacture drugs within their home
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country and was suffering from a serious health crisis.226 For LDCs and developing countries
with insufficient or no capacity to manufacture drugs, it is a necessity for their governments to
import drugs.227 Third world countries have only two ways to obtain medicine: to access cheap
medicine from countries with sufficient manufacturing capabilities (like India) or to pay
exorbitant monopoly prices.228

For example, the Indian government could grant compulsory

licenses to domestic manufacturers who could export medicines to LDCs to get around this
problem, but that process can be extremely difficult, time-consuming, and complicated for
governments to implement.229 Despite the public health need, there are many political and
practical reasons (including drug regulation, fear of trade sanctions, jeopardizing supply of aid
and investment from wealthy countries, etc.) why many governments do not grant compulsory
licenses.230 Accordingly, one example of the reluctance of developing countries to issue
compulsory license is that the Zambian government, which declared a state of national
emergency in September 2004, has been the only government willing to grant a compulsory
license for AIDS drugs still under patent based on the scale of its HIV-AIDS crisis.231
Additionally, wealthy developed country governments have a responsibility to
help improve global health to essential medicines to developing countries by contributing
to prevention, treatment, and support programs that improve access to essential
medicines, whether they are generic or brand name. Wealthy developed country
governments (including the U.S. and Western European countries) need to boost their
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support of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.232 A UNAIDS
report released as the 15th International AIDS Conference estimated the cost of HIV
prevention, drug treatment, and support of AIDS orphans in the developing world in 2005
at $12 billion and this jumps to $20 billion in 2007.233
Although, the U.S. initially led the world in contributions to the Global Fund, the
Bush Administration seems to favor its own program, President’s Emergency Program
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), that assist only the 15 hardest-hit countries rather than the
128 countries that the Global Fund assists.234 The French medical organization Doctors
Without Borders235 contends that the Bush Administration’s policies are designed to
squash generic AIDS drugs because these drugs are made by overseas companies that
ignore Western patents and have lower labor expenses.236 The Global Fund accepts and
uses these generic medicines, but the U.S. refuses to do so whereas the majority of the
drugs prescribed by Doctors Without Borders are generic copies costing $140 to $300 a
year, compared with $12,000 for brand-name equivalents.237 For example, skeptics assert
the Bush Administration’s program that approves generic drugs only if the companies can
prove the generics work the same as their patented counterparts, is just another barrier to
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keep generics out of their program.238 No generic drug to date has been cleared by this
“fast track” process.239
Further, developed country governments’ have a duty to provide support for the TRIPS
flexibilities affirmed in the Doha Declaration. Unfortunately, in recent years, there has been a
“systematic dismantling” of the Doha Declaration due to corporate and governmental undue
influence.240 This “systematic dismantling” has been caused by the lack of political support for
the use of TRIPS flexibilities.241 One example of this is reflected in the “TRIPS plus” provisions
in bilateral trade agreements with the U.S., which effectively destroy the Doha Declaration’s
intent to utilize these flexibilities.242 Even the European Parliament is concerned with the
dismantling of the Doha Declaration advanced “insidiously through US-initiated Free Trade
Agreements.”243 For example, the proposed Central American Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
between the U.S., five Central American nations, and the Dominican Republic “essentially grants
pharmaceutical companies a monopoly on new drugs registered in member countries.”244
CAFTA even goes further than TRIPS “by requiring member countries to compensate patent
owners for ‘unreasonable delays’ in obtaining a patent or market approval of a patented product
by extending the patent life.”245 Developed countries play a big role in giving political support
for these flexibilities.246 For example, it has been recommended to the European Parliament that
it ensure that the European Commission “provides strong political support to countries that use
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the TRIPS flexibilities and offers technical assistance.”247 Further, the European Commission
must ensure that the Indian government, with its new Indian patent policies, will be able to
continue its production and exportation of generic versions of newer medicines.248
Another instance of misinterpretation and misapplication of the Doha Declaration leading
to the “systematic dismantling” of the Doha Declaration was by Canada, which contrary to the
purpose of the WTO’s Decision, Canada created a list of approved medicines that could be
exported in generic form to developing countries.249 This list of approved medicines allowed
drug industry lobbyists to keep new medicines off the list of approved medicines.250 This
included Bayer’s pneumonia therapy drug (moxifloxacin) and certain fixed dose AIDS drug
combinations which are recommended by the WHO and which are vital for treating AIDS in
developing countries.251
Regretfully, these hollow measures are often hailed as great progress, and the public and
parliamentarians are led to believe that access problems have been resolved and that affordable
medicines will now become available and no further action is needed. Such an approach would be
disastrous.252

As of January 1, 2005, the access to new drugs is expected to become even more
difficult.253 This is because starting in 2005 all new drugs may be subject to at least 20 years of
patent protection in all countries excluding the LDCs and the non-WTO countries.254 However,
a major concern is India because it supplies the majority of the affordable ARVs essential for
247
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AIDS treatment.255 According to the WHO, a number of developing countries implementing
HIV-AIDS treatment programs are concerned with the catastrophic effects to their own countries
based solely on India’s implementation of TRIPS.256 Brazil and Thailand provide examples of
other developing countries that had successfully implemented HIV-AIDS programs before
January 1, 2005 because key drugs had not yet been patent protected and therefore, these
countries were producing HIV-AIDS drugs locally at much lower costs.257 However, based on
these new restrictions and challenges imposed after January 1, 2005, it is crucial that developed
and developing countries adhere to the flexibilities discussed in the TRIPS Agreement and
affirmed in the Doha Declaration to provide access to developing countries.258
The implications for developing countries as a result of TRIPS restricting competition,
increasing prices, and limiting access to essential medicines are critical. TRIPS should be
amended to take into consideration developing country interests by eliminating pharmaceutical
monopolies and promoting global health through the imposition of governmental and corporate
duties to provide access to essential medicines. However, until TRIPS is amended to promote
access for all, all member countries should keep the following suggestions in mind as developing
countries attempt to comply with the January 1, 2005 WTO deadline for domestic adoption of
TRIPS compliant patent laws in developing countries.
First, it is imperative that generic drug producing countries (like Brazil, Thailand, and
India) realize the importance of the public health safeguards affirmed in the Doha Declaration
and routinely make use of these compulsory licenses and government use provisions in order to
allow the export of these medicines and to enable the generic competition to drive down the
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prices of these medicines.259 Second, it is important for developing country manufacturers to set
a policy that if a patent holder does not respond to production on reasonable commercial terms
within a stipulated period, a compulsory license will be granted in that country.260 Third, the
developing country manufacturer should limit the patent holder’s royalty because setting high
royalties allows the patent holder to take money from the manufacturer without any real
contribution to the manufacturing process.261 Fourth, although the compulsory license will be
predominately for the manufacturing countries’ domestic market, it is crucial to allow export to
developing countries and LDCs with insufficient or no capacity to manufacture drugs without the
government being required to get the patent holder’s permission to export.262 Finally,
developing countries should emphasize the importance of the basic initial requirements of
granting patents including novelty, inventive step, and industrial application.263 If these
requirements are not met, too many patented drug monopolies will be created.264 For example,
combination drugs and compounds do not meet the requirement of inventive step; therefore they
should not be worthy of patent protection.265
V. CURRENT DOMESTIC PHARMACEUTICAL PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. Indian Pharmaceutical Patent Law and Recent Developments
A number of countries produce generic drugs including Canada, Brazil, South Africa,
China, and Singapore, but the biggest producer is India.266 Indian companies not only produce
the finished tablet form of generic drugs, but they also produce cheaper versions of the raw
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ingredients and chemicals to export to major pharmaceutical companies to use in their brand
name drugs.267 A number of developing countries also produce generic AIDS drugs including
Brazil, which has a very large generic pharmaceutical industry that enables its government to
provide free ARVs to everyone that needs them.268 India also produces large volumes of ARVs
for its own people and for export.269 These thriving generic pharmaceutical industries in
developing countries, especially India, have shown that the price fixed by pharmaceutical
companies have nothing to do with the cost of production, but more to do with the power of
these companies as monopolies.270
“On May 6, 1981, Indira Gandhi declared India’s policy when she said her ‘idea of a
better world is one in which medical discoveries would be free from patent and there will be no
profiteering from life and death.’”271 India’s policy quickly changed between 1987 and 1994
when the WTO treaty was negotiated.272 The Indian Parliamentary records reflected great
concern with the “‘grave impact of the proposed patent . . . on the drug prices in the country’ and
warned that the ‘primacy of public interests for the right of patent holders should be ensured.’”273
India passed the First Patents Amendment Act in 1999, the Second Amendment Act in 2002, and
the Third Amendment Bill of 2003, which did not contain any ameliorative amendments and
which was passed without change or discussion due to the implicit threat of WTO retaliation for
non-compliance.274 From 1995 to 2004, many foreign pharmaceutical companies filed
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anticipatory claims against generic manufacturers under the WTO’s “mail box” procedure,275
which would become full-fledged patents on January 1, 2005.276
Until the end of 2004, India had no regulations on patenting, which is one of the reasons
generic drug manufacturing became such a large-scale industry.277 However, as India was
mandated to meet the January 1, 2005 deadline to comply with the TRIPS regime, some of the
cheap, generic anti-AIDS drugs India is famed for could be a thing of the past due to the new
Indian patent laws that will come into force.278 By rushing to comply with the TRIPS deadline,
some argue that India has turned its own domestic law upside down and has given greater
credence to WTO deadlines than to democracy.279
The WTO treaty is not the only treaty that India has to comply with. It is also a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Civil and Political and Economic and Social
Rights Covenants (1996) and a host of others. The Supreme Court decisions culminating in and
following Vishaka’s case (1997) have directly imported many human rights into the life and
liberty provisions of Article 21, including the right to health. The WTO cannot over-rise these
obligations. 280

Fortunately, although most of the ARVs listed as essential treatments by the WHO did
not become physically available until 1996 or later, they had been patented well before TRIPS
was introduced in 1995, therefore they can continue to be produced by India legally.281 For
drugs patented after 1995, if the original drug producer had also filed for and had been granted a
patent in India, as of January 1, 2005282 all current production of that drug must stop and all
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future production would be illegal for 20 years.283 Developing countries, like India, are not
influenced by the same sources or factors as developed countries (powerful pharmaceutical
lobbyists and international trade) when creating national patent laws.284 Instead, India’s patent
laws have been influenced by protectionism.285
India adopted weak patent laws especially with respect to pharmaceuticals due to
concerns about the future of India’s pharmaceutical industry and domestic health concerns.286
In response to TRIPS, as well as to disputes with the U.S. and the WTO, the Indian government
adopted the 1999 Patents Amendment Act to comply with WTO recommendations.287 This Act
sought to provide stronger patent protection for foreign pharmaceuticals and to create stronger
domestic research capabilities.288 For example, an Indian company (Ranbaxy Lab, Inc.) signed a
$90 million dollar joint venture with Eli Lilly & Co. to collaborate for pharmaceutical research
and development.289 These Indian patent laws could allow the Indian pharmaceutical industry to
modernize its pharmaceutical industry and compete with the developed world.290
Although India has historically been against international patent regimes, in March 2005,
the Indian government seriously considered whether it should strengthen its domestic patent
protection based on the current strength of its pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.291 In
2004, the Indian Parliament originally attempted to adopt domestic legislation to comply with
TRIPS, but when parliamentary approval for a modified patent law system became impossible in
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December 2004, the Indian government introduced an ordinance to ensure TRIPS compliance in
time for the deadline.292 This patent ordinance was heavily criticized and opposed by civil
society groups and the Indian parliament for going beyond the demands of TRIPS.293 Further, it
was argued that the patent ordinance failed to fully incorporate the public health flexibilities
provided in TRIPS and the Decision, outlining the circumstances under which countries can
export and import generic versions of drugs still under patent.294
Accordingly, on March 23, 2005, the Indian government passed a controversial patent
law designed to replace the patent ordinance following heated debate between the global drug
industry and Indian firms versus Indian generic manufacturers (Cipla) over the last few
months.295 NGOs argue that effective compulsory licensing procedures play an important role in
reducing the price of drugs and in ensuring access to affordable medicines, however the new
Indian patent law is not adequate.296 The Indian Union Minister of Commerce and Industry
argues that the Indian government included enough safeguards in the 2005 Patents Amendment
Act to prevent drug price increases.297 The Indian Union Minister of Commerce and Industry,
Shri Kamal Nath in support of the new Indian patent law said:
The price of medicines will not shoot up due to patents, because of these strong safeguards, checks
and balances. There are comprehensive provisions in the amended Act to deal with issues
concerning the price and availability of medicines. These include provisions for compulsory
licensing to ensure availability of products at reasonable price; parallel import of products;
acquisition of patent rights by the government; revocation of patents in the public interest; and
provisions to deal with emergency situations.298
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B. South African Pharmaceutical Patent Law and Recent Developments
Unlike India’s patent laws, which have been influenced by protectionism, South Africa’s
controversial patent laws have been influenced by the serious public health crisis in South Africa
due to HIV-AIDS.299 Therefore, in 1997, the South African Parliament passed the Medicines
and Related Substances Control Act based on its public health crisis.300 The Minister of Health
was allowed to use the tools within this Act to override patent protections including parallel
importing and compulsory licensing to provide access to pharmaceuticals.301 The Act allowed
the South African government to use compulsory licensing provided the drug was initially
marketed by the patentee or with the patentee’s consent and the drug does not have other
restrictions.302 In fact, the patent holder rights would be overruled if those patent rights
prevented South African companies from domestically developing effective versions of the
medicines.303
The [M]inister [of Health] may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines .
. . so as to protect the health of the public, and . . . may [allow the importation of medicine] which
is imported by a person other than the person who is the holder of the [patent]. [T]he council may
. . . issue . . . a license to manufacture or act as a wholesaler of or distribute . . . such medicine or
medicinal device.304

However, in April 2001, the South African Parliament passed the South African
Medicines and Medical Devices Regulated Authority Act (SAMMDRA).305 Since SAMMDRA
was passed, the South African government has not attempted to grant any compulsory licenses
and therefore, the international community has lifted its intense pressure to strictly comply with
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TRIPS.306 Recently, some progress in solving the lack of access concerns of South Africa have
been made due to reductions in drug prices and withdrawal of litigation.307 For example, the
pharmaceutical industry dropped its court case against South Africa and the U.S. government
dropped its WTO dispute settlement proceeding against Brazil.308
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR REFORM OF THE GLOBAL
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION SYSTEM UNDER TRIPS
The current system of global pharmaceutical patent protection under TRIPS needs to be
amended or revised to consider more specifically the needs of developing countries. Some
examples of possible solutions and considerations to improve access include:
•

Reducing the Prices and Increasing the Access to Pharmaceuticals in Developing
Countries309

•

Recognizing the Importance and Value of Generic Competition in International Trade310

•

Creating a Systematic Tiered Pricing Mechanism for Pharmaceuticals311

•

In Granting Patent Protection, Emphasize Inventive Step and Novelty and Limit the
Duration and Scope of Patent Protection in Developing Countries312

•

Creating or Amending Domestic Patent Laws to Make Full Use of the Flexibilities
(Public Health Safeguards) in TRIPS by Emphasizing Public Health Over Patent Rights
(Preventing the Systematic Dismantling of the Doha Declaration)313

•

Allowing Developing Countries Without the Ability to Manufacture Pharmaceuticals To
More Easily Be Able to Import Them314
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•

Eliminating Developed Country Strategies for Bullying of Developing Countries (i.e.,
elimination of trade sanctions, TRIPS plus provisions in bilateral or regional trade
agreements, contingent technical assistance, etc.)315

•

Creating an International Fund for Research, Subsidizing Pharmaceutical Costs,
Improving Health Services, and Improving Delivery Systems316
Recently, developing countries have gained considerable power in the world of

international trade. “The World Trade Organization’s ministerial conferences have demonstrated
a considerable willingness on the part of developing countries to build alliances among
themselves as a way of countering the [influence] of the rich [developed] countries during trade
negotiations.”317 The inequalities created within the WTO agreements gave an overwhelming
amount of power to rich developed countries.318 Developing countries must remedy the
unfairness found in these WTO trade agreements by adopting stronger negotiating postures
within the WTO trade talks.319 Developed countries like the U.S. and the E.U. have to be
prevented from imposing their individually created “agreements” on other less powerful
members.320 Therefore, developing countries have to build solid alliances among themselves
focused on specific negotiating proposals in order to be effective in trade talks.321 Although, it
seems impossible for developing countries to counter the intense political and financial power of
big developed countries, developing countries are gaining some power within the WTO. This
new, strong posture of developing countries has gradually emerged from the WTO Seattle
Ministerial Conference demonstrations and from the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference
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proposals offered by developing countries on access to medications, which led to the Doha
Declaration.322
While considerable progress has been made in including developing countries like Brazil
and India in the decision-making nucleus of the WTO, a series of new challenges have emerged
from this new developing country power dynamic.323 Although the involvement of developing
countries in the decision-making process is a clear improvement, the exclusion of other
developing countries is unacceptable.324 It is crucial not to create a WTO decision-making
process, where the decisions are primarily made in small group alliances, whether developed or
developing countries.325 Encouraging these small alliances between member countries ultimately
encourages the exclusion of certain other member countries.326 Therefore, it is important to
keep the decision-making process open to all member countries to create an international trade
system based on democratic form and transparency.327 In order for the developing country
power dynamics emerging from the WTO Cancun Ministerial Conference to be transformed into
an opportunity for fairer international trade rules and an opportunity for developing countries to
succeed in counterbalancing the dominance of the developed countries, the dialogue within and
between the groups of developing countries must continue to be deepened.328
VII. CONCLUSION
Few of the victims of poverty-related diseases have heard of the WTO. Fewer still have had an
opportunity to engage in debate over the implications of its rules for their welfare. Yet world trade
laws have profound implications for developing countries –and nowhere more so than in the area
of patents and public health. Governments in all developing [countries] are currently
implementing sweeping changes in order to bring national legislation in line with WTO
obligations [under TRIPS]. [Developing countries are doing this to avoid] threats of trade
sanctions initiated by [developed countries, primarily the] US government acting on behalf of
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corporations [including pharmaceutical companies,] which stand to gain significant increases in
their profits as a result of the new [patent] regime [being strictly enforced in developing
countries].329

Between 2000 and 2020, it is estimated that sixty-eight million people will die from HIVAIDS in the most affected countries.330 Further, adult HIV-AIDS infection rates have escalated
to 20.1% in South Africa and 37.5% in Botswana.331 The HIV-AIDS epidemic continues to
consume China, Indonesia, Central Asia, the Baltic States, and North Africa.332 Since the
adoption of TRIPS in 1994, slight improvements have been made in the global pharmaceutical
patent system through the participation of the member countries in the WTO, the recognition by
governments of the importance of the public health of its citizens and global public health, and
the gradual flexibility of pharmaceutical companies in finding a solution to the HIV-AIDS
crisis.333
TRIPS should be amended or reformed to consider the needs of developing countries.
The implicit and explicit exceptions contained in TRIPS Article 8, 27, 30, 31, and 73, the Doha
Declaration, and the Decision have all attempted to clarify the power of individual countries to
protect the public health of their citizens. In reality, these safeguards are not enough. The
arguments developed countries offer for the imposition of stringent patent protection in
developing countries do not outweigh the potential harm created by allowing pharmaceutical
companies to have monopolies that limit access to essential medicines. Pharmaceutical
companies, generic drug manufacturers, and governments all have a duty to improve the access
of developing countries to drugs including combination and second-line generic drugs. The
current domestic pharmaceutical protection of patents in developing countries including India
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and South Africa is emerging with the January 1, 2005 TRIPS compliance mandate. Some
possible solutions to improve access to drugs in developing countries are allowing generic
competition, creating a tiered pricing mechanism to reduce prices, and providing political
support for utilizing the public health safeguards contained in TRIPS. Unfortunately, AIDS and
other infectious diseases are only some of the numerous problems facing developing countries
today. Developing countries also lack the infrastructure and public health systems necessary to
implement widespread disease treatment programs. Developed and developing countries should
work together to develop an international pharmaceutical patent system that truly promotes
global public health by providing equal access to all.
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